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Opening paragraph 
The Paris Agreement has opened debate on whether limiting warming to 
1.5°C is compatible with current emission pledges and warming of about 
0.9°C from the mid-19th-century to the present decade. We show that limiting 
cumulative post-2015 CO2 emissions to about 200 GtC would limit post-2015 
warming to less than 0.6°C in 66% of Earth System Model members of the 
CMIP5 ensemble with no mitigation of other climate drivers, increasing to 
240GtC with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation. We combine a simple climate-
carbon-cycle model with estimated ranges for key climate system properties 
from the IPCC 5th Assessment Report. Assuming emissions peak and decline 
to below current levels by 2030 and continue thereafter on a much steeper 
decline, historically unprecedented but consistent with a standard ambitious 
mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), gives a likely range of peak warming of 1.2-
2.0°C above the mid-19th-century. If CO2 emissions are continuously adjusted 
over time to limit 2100 warming to 1.5°C, with ambitious non-CO2 mitigation, 
net future cumulative CO2 emissions are unlikely to prove less than 250 GtC 
and unlikely greater than 540GtC. Hence limiting warming to 1.5°C is not yet a 
geophysical impossibility, but likely requires delivery on strengthened pledges 
for 2030 followed by challengingly deep and rapid mitigation. Strengthening 
near-term emissions reductions would hedge against a high climate response 
or subsequent reduction-rates proving economically, technically or politically 
unfeasible. 
  
Main text:  
The aim of Paris Agreement is “holding the increase in global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts 
to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C”1. The Parties also undertook to 
achieve this goal by reducing net emissions “to achieve a balance between 
anthropogenic sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the 
second half of this century”, and hence implicitly not by geo-engineering 
planetary albedo. Under what conditions is this goal geophysically feasible? 
 
Human-induced warming reached an estimated 0.93°C (±0.13°C; 5-95 
percentile range) above mid-19th-century conditions in 2015 and is currently 
increasing at almost 0.2°C per decade2. Combined with the effects of El Niño 
and other sources of natural variability, total warming exceeded 1°C for the 
first time in 2015 and again in 20163. Average temperatures for the 2010s are 
currently 0.88°C above 1861-80, which would rise to 0.93°C should they 
remain at 2015 levels for the remainder of the decade. With few exceptions4,5, 
mitigation pathways that could achieve peak or end-of-century warming of 
1.5°C have thus far received little attention. Even the “Paris, increased 
ambition” scenario of ref. 6 results in CO2 emissions still well above zero in 
2100 and hence a low chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C. 
 
Long-term anthropogenic warming is determined primarily by cumulative 
emissions of CO27–10: the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (IPCC-AR5) found that 
cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 had to remain below 615GtC for total 
anthropogenic warming to remain below 1.5°C in more than 66% of members 
of the CMIP5 ensemble of Earth System Models (ESMs)11 (see Fig. 1a). 
Accounting for the 545GtC that had been emitted by the end of 201412, this 
would indicate a remaining budget from 2015 of less than 7 years’ current 
emissions, while current commitments under the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) indicate 2030 emissions close to current levels13.  
 
The scenarios and simulations on which these carbon budgets were based, 
however, were designed to assess futures in absence of CO2 mitigation, not 
the very ambitious mitigation scenarios and correspondingly small amounts of 
additional warming above present that are here of interest. Furthermore, 
many mitigation scenarios begin reductions in 2010 and are already 
inconsistent with present-day emissions, complicating the comparison with 
pledges for 2030.  
 
Updating carbon budgets and scenarios for ambitious mitigation goals 
The black cross on Fig. 1a shows an estimate of human-induced warming, 
which excludes the impact of natural fluctuations such as El Niño, in 2015 
(0.93±0.13°C relative to 1861-80; 5-95 percentile range) and pre-2015 
cumulative carbon emissions (545±75GtC since 1870; 1 standard deviation). 
While both quantities are individually consistent with the CMIP5 ensemble, in 
the mean CMIP5 response (coloured lines) cumulative emissions do not 
reach 545GtC until after 2020, by which time the CMIP5 ensemble-mean 
human-induced warming is over 0.3°C warmer than the central estimate for 
human-induced warming to 2015. In estimating the outstanding carbon budget 
for 1.5°C, this is an important discrepancy. IPCC-AR5 also calculated the 
percentiles of the CMIP5 distribution that exceeded given thresholds of 
warming relative to the average of 1986-2005 (Table 12.3 of ref 14), adding a 
further 0.61°C to express these relative to 1850-1900. However, this 
reference period and the GCM ensemble used in this table are not identical to 
the ESM ensemble used to derive estimates of the carbon budget, for which a 
volcano-free reference period is preferred, to focus on human-induced 
warming. Moreover, since the discrepancy in warming between ESMs and 
observations only emerges after 2000, expressing warming relative to the 
1986-2005 reference period does not entirely resolve it and also does not 
address the small underestimate in cumulative emissions to date. Fig. 1b 
shows an alternative analysis of the CMIP5 ensemble to assess the remaining 
carbon budget for an additional 0.6°C of warming beyond the current decade, 
a possible interpretation of ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C’ in light of estimated human-induced warming to date. The median 
response of the CMIP5 models indicates allowable future cumulative 
emissions (threshold-exceedance budget or TEB15)  of 223GtC for a further 
0.6°C warming above the 2010-2019 average, and a 204GtC remaining TEB 
from 2015 to keep warming likely below this value (meaning, by the time 
cumulative emissions from 2015 reach 204GtC, 66% of CMIP5 models have 
warmed less than 0.6°C above the present decade, consistent with the 
methodology for assessing the 2°C carbon budget in IPCC-AR516). Given 
uncertainty in attributable human-induced warming to date, differences 
between observational products and true global surface air temperature17, and 
the precise interpretation of the 1.5°C goal in the Paris Agreement (for 
example, the choice of pre-industrial reference period which temperatures are 
defined relative to18), budgets corresponding to a range of levels of future 
warming should also be considered – see Table 1 and the Supplementary 
Information.  
 
TEBs are useful because peak CO2-induced warming is a function (shown by 
the grey plume in figure 1) of cumulative CO2 emissions and approximately 
independent of emission path, although threshold behaviour, such as sudden 
carbon release from thawing permafrost, might complicate this relationship19. 
This does not apply to non-CO2 forcing, which is relatively more important for 
ambitious mitigation scenarios. The rapid warming from the 2000s to the 
2030s in CMIP5 arises partly from strong increases in net non-CO2 forcing 
over this period in the driving RCP scenarios, due to simulated rapid 
reductions in cooling aerosol forcing. It remains unclear whether this increase 
in non-CO2 forcing will be observed if future reductions in aerosol emissions 
occur because present-day effective non-CO2 forcing is still highly uncertain20. 
Table 2 shows budgets for thresholds of future warming in the CMIP5 
ensemble under an RCP2.6 scenario, a stabilisation scenario in which non-
CO2 forcing across the rest of the century remains closer to the 2010-2019 
average than in the RCP8.5 scenario. This allows more CO2-induced warming 
for the same total, increasing the median TEB of the CMIP5 distribution for an 
additional 0.6°C to 303GtC and the 66th percentile to 242GtC.  
 
In many current ambitious mitigation scenarios (e.g. RCP2.621, dark blue lines 
in fig. 2), substantial CO2 emission reductions begin in 2010, such that both 
emissions and forcing are already inconsistent with observed climate state 
and emission inventories to date. The thick dark green lines in Fig. 2 show an 
amended version of RCP2.6 that is more consistent with current emissions 
and estimated present-day climate forcing. This scenario, hereafter referred to 
as RCP2.6-2017, assumes the same proportional rates of change of 
emissions of both CO2 and other anthropogenic forcing components as in the 
standard RCP2.6 scenario from 2010, but with the mitigation start date 
delayed by 7 years to 2017 (following the RCP8.5 scenario22 between 2010-
2017). This is more representative of a possible mitigation pathway from 
today: many nations are already planning on policy action to reduce 
emissions over the 2015-2020 period, in anticipation of achieving their NDC 
commitments in the future. Total anthropogenic radiative forcing peaks in 
2050 (at 3.41 Wm-2) in RCP2.6-2017, as opposed to in 2043 (at 3.00 Wm-2) 
under RCP2.6. The grey lines represent emissions pathways from the IPCC 
430-480ppm scenario category23,24 but with proportional decreases in 
radiative forcing also delayed by 7 years to start in 2017.  
 
Figure 2c shows the implications of these scenarios for future warming, 
evaluated with a simple climate model that reproduces the response of the 
CMIP5 models to radiative forcing under ambitious mitigation scenarios 
(Supplementary Material). Like other simple climate models, this lacks an 
explicit physical link between oceanic heat and carbon uptake. It allows a 
global feedback between temperature and carbon uptake from the 
atmosphere, but no direct link with net deforestation. It also treats all forcing 
agents equally, in the sense that a single set of climate response parameters 
are used in for all forcing components, despite some evidence of component 
specific responses25,26. We do not, however, attempt to calibrate the model 
directly against observations, using it instead to explore the implications of 
ranges of uncertainty in emissions12, and forcing and response derived 
directly from the IPCC-AR5, which are derived from multiple lines of evidence 
and, importantly, do not depend directly on the anomalously cool 
temperatures observed around 2010. Non-CO2 forcing and the transient 
climate response (TCR) co-vary within AR5 ranges to consistently reproduce 
present-day externally-forced warming (Methods), and as in figure 1b, we 
quote uncertainties in future temperatures relative to this level. 
 
The limits of the green plume in Fig. 2c show peak warming under the 
RCP2.6-2017 scenario is likely between 1.24-2.03°C (1.12-1.99°C for 2100 
warming) given a 2015 externally-forced warming of 0.92°C. The IPCC-AR5 
did not propose a ‘best-estimate’ value of the TCR, but using a central value 
of 1.6°C (the median of a log-normal distribution consistent with IPCC-AR5 
likely ranges, the typical shape of most reported TCR distributions in ref. 16), 
RCP2.6-2017 gives a median peak warming of 1.55°C above pre-industrial 
(1861-1880 mean) and 1.47°C in 2100, approximately consistent with as likely 
as not (50% probability) of warming below 1.5°C in 2100.  
 
The shaded green bands show the central four probability sextiles of the 
distribution of responses to RCP2.6-2017 for a log-normal distribution for TCR 
(see Supplementary Material for alternative distributions). Under RCP2.6-
2017, peak warming is likely below 2°C, and well below 2°C by the end of the 
century. However, such a scenario cannot exclude a non-negligible probability 
of peak warming significantly in excess of 2°C, particularly given the 
possibility of non-linear climate feedbacks for which there is some evidence in 
more complex GCMs27.  
 
Emissions in Fig. 2a are diagnosed from radiative forcing in Fig. 2b using a 
version of the IPCC-AR5 carbon cycle impulse-response function28, with a 
minimal modification to account for the change in the impulse response 
between pre-industrial and 21st century conditions due to atmospheric CO2 
and temperature-induced feedbacks on carbon uptake, as observed in Earth 
System Models29.  This simple model reproduces the response of ESMs to 
ambitious mitigation scenarios (Supplementary Information) including, with 
best-estimate parameters, near-constant temperatures following a cessation 
of CO2 emissions. The temperature response of the UVic Earth System 
Climate Model (UVic ESCM)30–32 driven by the diagnosed RCP2.6-2017 
emissions scenario and non-CO2 forcing is shown in Fig. 2c (orange line), 
which is emulated well by the simple carbon-cycle-climate model with 
equivalent climate response parameters (thin green line, see Methods). 
Carbon-cycle feedback uncertainties (see Methods) only have limited scope 
to influence the allowable emissions under scenarios in which concentrations 
and temperatures peak at a relatively low level.  
 
Since RCP2.6-2017 represents a scenario with ambitious CO2 and non-CO2 
mitigation, it currently lies near the lower limit of 2100 anthropogenic forcing 
available in the literature4,15, as shown by the grey lines in Figure 2. We have 
not assumed any additional non-CO2 mitigation beyond RCP2.6, but 
uncertainties in mitigation technologies and demand reduction measures 
decades into the future mean that non-CO2 mitigation may yet play a larger 
role than indicated here. 
 
Adaptive mitigation paths and implications for carbon budgets 
The Paris Agreement establishes a regime of continuously updated 
commitments informed by on-going scientific and policy developments and 
the overarching temperature and emission reduction goal. We therefore re-
estimate carbon budgets, accounting for the present-day climate state and 
current uncertainty in the climate response, and assuming mitigation efforts 
are perfectly adapted over time to achieve a warming in 2100 of 1.5°C for a 
range of possible realisations of the climate response2,33. Figure 3a shows a 
distribution of future temperature trajectories, for different climate responses, 
that are all consistent with observed attributable warming in 2015 and a 
smooth transition to 1.5°C in 2100. The limits of the green plume show 
temperature trajectories associated with IPCC-AR5 likely ranges for TCR and 
equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), with bands delineating the central four 
sextiles of the distribution. These temperatures initially follow the responses to 
the RCP2.6-2017 scenario (the green plumes in Figure 2c) but are then 
smoothly interpolated over the coming century to the trajectory given by the 
best-estimate response (see Supplementary Methods). This provides a simple 
representation of goal-consistent pathways for a range of possible climate 
responses34. In contrast to a scenario-driven, forward-modelling approach 
(e.g. ref. 6 and Fig. 2), the temperature trajectories in Figure 3a define the 
scenario, from which corresponding CO2 emission pathways (Figure 3b) are 
derived, similar to the temperature-tracking approach used by ref 10. This 
implicitly assumes that information on the emerging climate response is 
available and acted upon instantaneously. In reality, both resolving the 
response and adapting policies will be subject to delay, although the impact 
can be reduced if policies respond to both observed and decadal predictions 
of human-induced warming, which are much better constrained than long-
term projections of, for example, ECS.  
 
Green bands in Fig. 3b show emissions compatible with the goal-consistent 
temperature trajectories and climate responses of Figure 3a, computed using 
the modified IPCC-AR5 impulse-response function with carbon-cycle 
feedback uncertainty assumed positively correlated with TCR (see Methods). 
Such an assumption may be pessimistic, but uncertainty in these feedbacks 
may also be underestimated in CMIP5 – the impact of thawing permafrost, for 
example, is generally not represented. 
 
Fig. 3c shows cumulative emissions (net carbon budgets) consistent with 
limiting warming to 1.5°C warming in 2100 under the climate response 
uncertainty distribution and these goal-consistent pathways. The median (‘as 
likely as not’) case corresponds to a cumulative budget of 370GtC 
(1400GtCO2 - all carbon budgets given to 2 significant figures) from 2015 to 
2100, including ~10GtC of net negative emissions in the final decades. 
Compared to this, higher cumulative CO2 emissions budgets are associated 
with lower climate responses and vice versa (hence the ordering of the 
coloured bands in 3a and 3b). Assuming completely successful adaptive CO2 
mitigation to achieve a warming of 1.5°C in 2100 (allowing for mid-century 
temperature overshoots, assuming non-CO2 forcing following RCP2.6-2017, 
and imposing no restrictions on the rate of net carbon dioxide removal), the 
cumulative carbon budget from 2015 to 2100 is unlikely (<33% probability) to 
be less than 250GtC (920GtCO2), in good agreement with the 242GtC TEB 
for the 66th percentile of the CMIP5 distribution for 0.6°C warming above the 
2010-2019 average in the RCP2.6 scenario (Table 2). Conversely, cumulative 
future emissions from 2015 compatible with a warming of 1.5°C in 2100 are 
unlikely to be greater than 540GtC (the top of the 50-67% band in Figure 3c) 
even under such an idealised perfectly responsive mitigation policy. The 
relationship between CO2-induced future warming compatible with the 
cumulative emissions shown in Fig. 3c is also broadly consistent that 
expected from the IPCC-AR5 likely range of TCRE (see Fig. S4), which, when 
combined with varying contributions from non-CO2 forcing, informs the all-
forcing budgets quoted here.  
 
The small difference that varying TCR makes to warming between 2015 and 
2030 (Fig. 3a) highlights both the importance of continuous quantifications of 
human-induced warming in any stock-take of progress to climate stabilization, 
and the need for a precautionary approach even under an adaptive mitigation 
regime34.  Although more progress has been made on constraining TCR than 
ECS, uncertainties are unlikely to be resolved rapidly. Allowing emissions to 
rise in the hope of a low climate response risks infeasible subsequent 
reductions should that hope prove ill founded. Conversely, the risk of “over-
ambitious” mitigation is low: the darkest green plume in fig. 3b shows that the 
difference between a TCR of 1.3°C and 1°C has a substantial impact on the 
allowable carbon budget for 1.5°C, but the probability of a TCR in that range 
is already assessed to be low. Since IPCC-AR5 a number of studies have 
suggested an increase in the lower bound on TCR towards 1.3°C (e.g ref. 25), 
whilst others indirectly support a 1.0°C lower bound through upward revisions 
of radiative forcing35,36. Using a TCR likely range of 1.3-2.5°C and an ECS 
likely range of 2.0-4.5°C, the remaining budget for a 1.5°C warming would be 
unlikely greater than 400GtC and unlikely less than 220GtC (see 
Supplementary Information figure S18).  
 
Discussion and implications for the ‘emissions gap’ 
Much recent policy discussion has centred on the ‘emissions gap’ between 
the NDCs emerging from the Paris Agreement and emission scenarios 
consistent with 1.5°C and 2°C13,37. The extent of any ‘gap’ depends on the 
uncertain climate response; the definition of the Paris Agreement goals; the 
interpretation, delivery and/or revision of the NDCs, and in particular the 
technical and/or socio-economic feasibility of subsequent emissions 
reductions.  
 
Considerable uncertainties are associated with the NDCs themselves13,38. 
Modelling indicates that the NDCs could be consistent with global fossil fuel 
and land-use change CO2 emissions in 2030 only slightly above 2015 
values6,13 (lower limit of the brown bar in Fig. 2a and 3b), close to the RCP2.6-
2017 scenario. This would imply that if (i) NDCs are fully implemented 
(including all conditional elements), with plausible values for Chinese 
emissions in 2030, and (ii) RCP2.6-2017 mitigation rates are maintained after 
2030, then the NDCs would still remain inconsistent with future scenarios 
projected to correspond to a peak warming likely below 2°C and a 2100 
warming as likely as not below 1.5°C. However, a modest strengthening of the 
pledges corresponding to an approximate 10% reduction in proposed 2030 
emissions could achieve consistency with such scenarios. Hence the NDCs 
as they stand do not necessarily imply a commitment to a fundamentally 
different approach, such as resorting to solar radiation management (SRM), to 
achieve a warming of 1.5°C in 2100, if the climate response is close to or less 
than our central estimate and if emissions can be rapidly reduced after 2030. 
The RCP2.6-2017 scenario involves a smooth transition to slightly negative 
net CO2 emissions after 2080, which may require challenging rates of 
deployment of CO2 removal (CDR). Figure 3b shows that returning warming to 
1.5°C in 2100 under a higher climate response potentially requires very 
substantial rates of CDR, which may not be technically feasible or socio-
economically plausible.  
   
An additional caveat to assessments of a 2030 “emissions gap” is that most 
NDCs are formulated in terms of CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emissions, a 
composite metric of warming impact of different gases based on Global 
Warming Potentials (GWPs) from various IPCC reports. It is therefore 
impossible to assess precisely the 2030 emissions of CO2 itself that are 
compatible with these pledges without additional assumptions, because CO2-
eq pledges could be attained through varying combinations of long-lived and 
short-lived forcer mitigation39–41. Separate reporting of long-lived and short-
lived greenhouse gases in national pledges would help clarify their long-term 
implications41,42.  
 
Aside from scientific uncertainties and the interpretation of the NDCs, a crucial 
issue is the feasibility of achieving sufficient rates and levels of 
decarbonisation required by these ambitious mitigation scenarios. Rapid 
decarbonisation relies on societies being able to swiftly replace existing 
capital with new investments at massive scales. Inertia within the economic 
system is an important constraint on realisable mitigation pathways43. 
RCP2.6-like scenarios imply decarbonisation at over 0.3GtC/yr/yr in the 2030s 
and 2040s – or 4-6% per year sustained for multiple decades. If applied to 
gross CO2 emissions, such rates of reduction have historically only been 
observed globally for short periods, such as in the 1930s Great Recession 
and the 2nd World War, and regionally in the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union44. Sustained decarbonisation at these rates, and the associated capital 
displacement (run-down and replacement of fossil-fuel infrastructure), would 
be historically unprecedented, though the parallel between intentional policy-
driven decarbonisation in the future and historical rates remains unclear.  
 
Longer-term deep decarbonisation also relies on many energy system 
innovations, including development and deployment on an unprecedented 
scale of renewable energy as well as, as yet undemonstrated, amounts of 
carbon capture and storage and CDR45. Given possible limits to rates of 
decarbonisation, near-term mitigation ambition and delays in mitigation start 
dates may strongly influence peak and 2100 warming. The purple dashed 
lines in Fig. 2 illustrate this point with a simple scenario in which CO2 
emissions reduce linearly (at 0.17GtC/yr/yr, about 0.6GtCO2/yr/yr) from 2020 
in order to achieve approximately the same warming as RCP2.6-2017 in 
2100. Under this scenario, maximum rates of decarbonisation are much lower 
than in RCP2.6-2017, in both absolute and percentage terms, demonstrating 
the potential advantage of more ambitious near-term mitigation given the risk 
that subsequent RCP2.6-like rates of decarbonisation may be unachievable. 
 
More ambitious near-term mitigation may be more feasible than previously 
thought. The rapid growth of global emissions 2000-2013 was dominated by 
increases in Chinese emissions46, driven, at least in part, by unprecedented 
levels of debt-fuelled investment in carbon-intensive industries and capital 
stock47. Sustaining such expansion is likely to be neither necessary (the 
infrastructure is now built) nor feasible (the debt levels are likely to prove 
unsustainable)47. For these reasons, the possibility that both Chinese and 
global emissions are at or near their peak46,48 and could reduce from 2020, 
seems less far-fetched than it did. This could allow for the required 
strengthening of the NDCs in the 2020 review towards an RCP2.6-2017 
trajectory or beyond, more readily consistent a 1.5°C goal. 
 
Regular review of commitments is built in to the Paris Agreement. This 
stocktake should be extended to relate commitments directly to the long-term 
temperature goal. As human-induced warming progresses, the question must 
be asked: “Are we on track to reduce net emissions to zero to stabilise climate 
well below 2°C as agreed in Paris”? Regular updates of human-induced 
warming based on a standard and transparent methodology would allow 
countries to adapt commitments to the emerging climate response. Our 
analysis suggests that ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 
1.5°C’ is not chasing a geophysical impossibility, but likely requires a 
significant strengthening of the NDCs at the first opportunity in 2020 in order 
to hedge against the risks of a higher-than-expected climate response and/or 
economic, technical or political impediments to sustained reductions at 






90%	 66%	 50%	 33%	 10%	
0.3	 80	 106	 119	 142	 189	
0.4	 107	 133	 155	 172	 242	
0.5	 137	 168	 186	 209	 299	
0.6	 164	 204	 223	 250	 333	
0.7	 199	 245	 256	 289	 387	
0.8	 231	 279	 301	 333	 438	
0.9	 274	 321	 348	 376	 505	
1.0	 306	 358	 382	 421	 579	
1.1	 332	 395	 416	 464	 653	
 
Table 1: Future cumulative budgets (GtC) from January 2015 for percentiles 
of the distribution of RCP8.5 simulations of CMIP5 models and various levels 
of future warming above the modelled 2010-2019 average. Percentiles 
correspond to the percentage of CMIP5 models that have greater cumulative 





90%	 66%	 50%	 33%	 10%	
0.3	 89	 106	 118	 133	 245	
0.4	 106	 152	 173	 193	 NA	
0.5	 126	 191	 214	 258	 NA	
0.6	 143	 242	 303	 NA	 NA	
0.7	 170	 291	 NA	 NA	 NA	
0.8	 177	 372	 NA	 NA	 NA	
0.9	 277	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	
1.0	 468	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	
1.1	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	 NA	
 
Table 2: Future cumulative budgets (GtC) from January 2015 for percentiles 
of the distribution of RCP2.6 simulations of CMIP5 models and various levels 
of future warming above the modelled 2010-2019 average. Percentiles 
correspond to the percentage of CMIP5 models that have greater cumulative 
emissions for the given level of warming. If an insufficient number of models 
warm above a particular threshold to calculate a given percentile of the total 
model distribution a value of NA is given.   
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Figure 1: Warming as a function of cumulative CO2 emissions in the CMIP5 
ensemble. (a) Cumulative emissions since 1870 and warming relative to the 
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show the 5-95% range of model response under the RCPs and 1% annual 
CO2 increase scenarios respectively. Thick coloured lines show ensemble 
mean response to the RCP forcing scenarios. Ellipses show cumulative 
emissions and warming in 2100 for different categories of future emissions 
scenario. Black cross shows uncertainty in 2015 human-induced warming and 
observed cumulative emissions. (b) As for a) but with cumulative emissions 
given since January 2015 and warming relative to the period 2010-2019. 
Dashed vertical grey lines show the threshold exceedance budgets (TEBs) 
below which over 66% of models have warmed less than 1.5°C above 1861-
80 in panel (a), and less than 0.6°C above 2010-19 in panel (b). 
 
Figure 2: Emissions, forcing and temperature response associated with 
various mitigation scenarios. Solid lines in panel (b) show total anthropogenic 
forcing for RCP8.5 (red), RCP2.6 (dark blue), RCP2.6-2017 (dark green) and 
delayed IPCC-WG3 430-480ppm (grey) scenarios. Dotted lines show non-
CO2 forcing. Solid lines in panel (a) shows median diagnosed emissions, with 
green shading showing the central 4 probability sextiles in the carbon-cycle 
feedbacks distribution. The brown bar denotes projected emissions in 2030 
based on current NDCs. Solid lines in panel (c) show median temperature 
response, with green shading showing central 4 probability sextiles of 
response to RCP2.6-2017 radiative forcing. Black bar shows the likely range 
for the IPCC-AR5 scenario-independent projection for the average of the 
2016-2035 period49, while black dots represent HadCRUT4 observations 
(relative to right hand axis only). The response of the UVic ESCM (orange), 
and the simple climate model with identical climate response parameters (thin 
green), both driven by the diagnosed RCP2.6-2017 emissions scenario are 
shown in panel (c). These two lines correspond to the left hand axis only. 
Purple dashed lines in all panels show a hypothetical scenario with linear 




Figure 3: Temperature trajectories and associated emissions consistent with 
1.5°C warming in 2100 for a range of climate responses under an adaptive 
mitigation regime. Dark green line in panel (a) shows median response to 
RCP2.8-2017 scenario as in Fig. 2c, green plume shows temperature 
trajectories corresponding initially to central 4 sextiles of the response to 
RCP2.6-2017, then smoothly interpolated over 2017-2117 to the median 
response. The orange line shows the response of the UVic ESCM driven by 
diagnosed emissions from the simple climate-carbon-cycle model consistent 
with the interpolated temperature trajectory corresponding to the UVic ESCM 
climate response parameters. The thin green line shows the response of the 
simple climate-carbon-cycle model driven by the same emissions as the UVic 
ESCM with identical climate response parameters to UVic ESCM and 
identical carbon-cycle parameters to the standard RCP2.6-2017 scenario in 
Fig 1a. These two lines correspond to the left hand axis only. Panel (b) shows 
diagnosed emissions consistent with temperature trajectories in panel (a) and 
the corresponding response percentile. Brown and black bars shows INDC 
emission range and near-term temperature projection as in Fig. 2. Panel (c) 
shows cumulative emissions from 2015, or relative to 1870 (right hand axis) 






We refer to “climate response” as a specified combination of TCR and ECS 
throughout this paper. Our median estimate climate response (TCR=1.6°C, 
ECS=2.6°C) is defined as the median of log-normal distributions consistent 
with IPCC-AR5 likely bounds on TCR and ECS (TCR: 1.0-2.5°C; ECS: 1.5-
4.5°C). From this the likely above/below values are found from the 33rd and 
66th percentiles of the distribution (TCR: 1.3-1.9°C; ECS: 2.0-3.3°C ). The 
median TCR of this log-normal distribution is significantly lower than in the 
IPCC-AR5 ESM ensemble but is more consistent with observed warming to 
date than many ensemble members (see Supplementary Methods), indicative 
of the multiple lines of evidence used to derive the IPCC-AR5 uncertainty 
ranges. Although IPCC-AR5 did not explicitly support a specific distribution, 
there is some theoretical justification50 for a log-normal distribution for a 
scaling parameter like TCR. Reconciling IPCC-AR5 best-estimate of 
attributable warming trend over 1951-2010 with the best-estimate effective 
radiative forcing requires a best-estimate TCR near to 1.6°C under the simple 
climate model used here, consistent with a log-normal distribution. As a 
sensitivity study, we also assume a Gaussian distribution for TCR (see 
Supplementary Methods) that raises the 2015 attributable warming to 1.0°C 
but only marginally affects the remaining carbon budget for a 1.5°C warming 
above pre-industrial (the likely below budget is reduced to 240GtC).  
 
The ECS distribution used here is derived directly from the IPCC-AR5 likely 
bounds that drew on multiple lines of evidence, so our conclusions are not 
directly affected by uncertainties in the efficacy of ocean heat uptake that 
affect purely observational constraints on ECS51. We are not here arguing for 
the revision of uncertainty estimates on any climate response parameters, 
although any such revision would of course affect our conclusions. The 
implications of an increased lower bound on the climate response are shown 
in figure S18. 
 
Reproducing present day temperatures with differing values for both TCR and 
ECS requires these parameters to co-vary with present-day net anthropogenic 
radiative forcing52. In the best-estimate forcing case (Figure 2b), past and 
future effective radiative forcing components are individually scaled 
(multiplicatively) to match the respective best-estimate values for each 
component in 2011 as given in IPCC-AR525. Figures 2 and 3 scale past and 
future anthropogenic aerosol effective radiative forcing (the most uncertain 
forcing component28), along with accounting for combined uncertainty in the 
non-CO2 effective radiative forcing components that were assessed to have 
Gaussian distributed uncertainty in IPCC-AR5 (draws from this distribution are 
taken at a percentile equal to the TCR distribution draw). The aerosol 
radiative forcing scaling factor is chosen to give externally-forced warming 
above 1861-1880 equal to that under the median climate response (i.e. 
0.92°C in 2015) for all draws from the climate response distribution. In all 
cases shown the scaled 2011 aerosol forcing is within IPCC-AR5 assessed 
uncertainty bounds. A summary of climate system properties used is given in 
Table S1: in only one case (the TCRE value implied by the lowest, 17th, 
percentile) are these outside the AR5 “likely” ranges, and this parameter 
combination is only used in the figures, not our headline conclusions.  
 
Temperature anomalies are computed using a two-timescale impulse-
response model from ref. 29 and 28, in which surface temperatures adjust to an 
imposed radiative forcing with a fast and slow timescale characterising the 
uptake of heat into the upper and deep ocean (set at 8.4 and 409.5 years 
respectively as in ref. 28). The lower limit of the TCR likely range requires a 
total anthropogenic forcing of 3.54Wm-2 in 2011, slightly greater than the 
upper bound of the IPCC-AR5 confidence interval (3.33 Wm-2). Natural forcing 
is taken as given at http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/ and is 
smoothed with a 10-year standard deviation Gaussian filter beyond 2015 in all 
scenarios.  
 
In constructing temperature trajectories in Figure 3a, a smooth cosine 
interpolation of the CO2-induced warming is applied over the period 2017 to 
2117 between the response for a specific climate response parameter set to 
RCP2.6-2017 and the total warming under the RCP2.6-2017 median climate 
response (which meets the goal of 1.5°C in 2100). Non-CO2 warming remains 
as originally simulated under the climate response parameter set for RCP2.6-
2017 and only CO2-induced warming is adapted to force the total warming to 
asymptote towards the median response of RCP2.6-2017, corresponding to a 
scenario in which only CO2 policy responds to the emerging signal.  
 
CO2 emissions in Figure 2a and 3b are derived using the simple carbon-cycle 
impulse-response formulation in ref. 28, modified to make airborne fraction a 
linear function of both warming and cumulative carbon uptake by terrestrial 
and ocean sinks29. Emissions in all figures are smoothed with a Gaussian 
filter with a standard deviation of 2 years: note that our use of an acausal filter 
implies that emissions are continuously adjusted to projected human-induced 
warming over this timescale in addition to warming to date. Cumulative 
emissions (Figure 3c) are more robust than emission rates in any given year, 
since rates depend on the method used to construct these goal-consistent 
pathways. 
 
The strength of carbon cycle feedbacks (a single scaling factor applied to 
default 𝑟" and 𝑟# coefficients in ref. 29) varies from 0-2, consistent with CMIP5 
RCP2.6 ensemble (Sup. Info.). We assume that this scaling factor range 
corresponds to the 5-95 percentiles of a Gaussian distribution. In Figure 3, 
draws from this carbon-cycle feedback scaling factor distribution are taken at 
an equal percentile to that from the TCR distribution. This correlation between 
the TCR and carbon-cycle feedback distribution is chosen to maximise the 
range of carbon budgets calculated from Figure 3. For each carbon-cycle 
feedback strength, total airborne fraction is adjusted (via the 𝑟$ parameter in 
ref. 29) to reproduce observed CO2 emissions in 2014 and leads to a range of 
historical cumulative CO2 emissions of 467-598GtC (17th-83rd percentile of 
distribution), with a median estimate of 542GtC, under carbon-cycle only 
uncertainty.   
 
Figures 2c and 3a show a version of the simple carbon-cycle-climate model 
(thin green lines) with thermal climate response parameters as represented in 
the UVic Earth System Climate Model (version 2.9 - TCR=1.9°C and 
ECS=3.5°C)31,32 and default carbon-cycle parameters given in ref. 29. These 
parameters achieve a good emulation of the UVic ESCM response when 
driven with the RCP4.5 scenario (see Supplementary Methods). In Figure 2c, 
UVic ESCM and the UVic ESCM-emulation simple carbon-cycle-climate 
model version are driven by RCP2.6-2017 emissions, diagnosed from the 
simple climate-carbon-cycle model using the median climate response and 
carbon-cycle parameters (dark green line in Figure 2a) and RCP2.6-2017 
non-CO2 radiative forcing scaled as discussed previously, for a 1.9°C TCR. In 
Figure 3a, UVic ESCM and the UVic ESCM-emulation simple carbon-cycle-
climate model version are driven by diagnosed emissions corresponding to an 
interpolated temperature pathway at a 1.9°C TCR, consistent with the method 
described previously.    
 
We add an estimate of the 2030 land-use emissions in RCP2.6-2017 (2023 in 
RCP2.6) as derived from the MAGICC model53 (http://www.pik-
potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/), to the fossil fuel and industry emissions 
consistent with the NDCs from ref 12 for the brown bars in Figures 2 and 3.   
 
In analysis of the CMIP5 ensemble budgets given in Table 1 and 2, budgets 
are calculated in an identical fashion to ref. 54 (both in terms of models and 
initial condition ensemble members used). Budgets are TEBs and are derived 
from percentiles of the distribution of decadal means of CMIP5 RCP8.5 
integrations, linearly interpolating between adjacent rank-ordered ensemble 
members. In Table 2, where insufficient models cross a particular future 
warming threshold to calculate a particular percentile of the total model 
distribution at that threshold, no value is reported. For the grey (1%/yr CO2 
increase) plume in Figure 1, cumulative emissions and temperatures 
expressed from the beginning of the increase (1a) and relative to a ten-year 
period centred around the year in which concentrations reach the 2015 value 
of 398ppm (1b). Scenarios that peak and decline emissions were excluded 
from the red plume in Figure 1b. 
Code availability: Code will be available on request to the corresponding 
author. 
Data availability: RCP forcing data used in this study is available at 
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/   
 
Supplementary Information: Supplementary methods are included with this 
submission. 
References only in Methods: 
50. Pueyo, S. Solution to the paradox of climate sensitivity. Clim. Change 
113, 163–179 (2012). 
51. Armour, K. C. Energy budget constraints on climate sensitivity in light of 
inconstant climate feedbacks. Nat. Clim. Chang. 7, 331–335 (2017). 
52. Millar, R. J. et al. Model structure in observational constraints on 
transient climate response. Clim. Change 131, 199–211 (2015). 
53. Meinshausen, M., Raper, S. C. B. & Wigley, T. M. L. Emulating coupled 
atmosphere-ocean and carbon cycle models with a simpler model, 
MAGICC6--Part 1: Model description and calibration. Atmos. Chem. 
Phys. 11, 1417–1456 (2011). 
54. Stocker, T. F. et al. in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (eds. Stocker, T. F. 
et al.) 33–115 (Cambirdge University Press, 2013). 
 
